The IMF quickly stepped in to offer rescue loans to the worst-hit countries, including Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea.
国际货币基金组织迅速介入，向泰国、印尼和韩国等受金融危机影响最严重的国家提供救援贷款。
The conditions of these loans included the institution’s perennial demands for austerity and tighter monetary policies – even though none of these governments had run significant deficits, nor seen much inflation in their economies in the run-up to the crisis.
尽管在金融危机爆发前，这些国家的政府都没有出现过巨额赤字，也没有出现过严重的经济通胀，但是，获得这些贷款的条件仍涉及该机构对收缩及紧缩货币政策的长期要求。
The IMF also insisted on a long list of reforms designed to liberalise their economies and, in particular, to dismantle practices and institutions derided as corrupt and inefficient forms of “crony capitalism”.
国际货币基金组织还坚持推出一长串改革方案，旨在使这些国家实现经济自由化，特别是废除那些被嘲笑为腐败低效形式的“裙带资本主义”惯例和制度。
In South Korea, the IMF set its sights on the country’s huge conglomerates, or chaebol, such as Hyundai, which enjoyed close ties to the state and domestic banks.
在韩国，该组织将目光投向了该国的大型企业集团(财阀)，比如现代集团，这些财阀与韩国政府和国内银行关系密切。
In Indonesia, the IMF called for uprooting the vast system of patronage that enriched the family of long-ruling autocrat Suharto, such as the lucrative national clove monopoly, which produced a key ingredient of the kretek cigarettes popular in Indonesia, and was controlled by one of Suharto’s sons.
在印度尼西亚，该组织要求铲除使长期执政独裁者苏哈托家族致富的庞大庇护体系，比如利润丰厚的丁香垄断企业，该企业生产流行于该国的丁香烟的重要原料，且由独裁者苏哈托的一个儿子控制。
By intervening in sectors that had little to do with the currency crisis, the IMF appeared to be announcing the scale of its ambition.
通过对与货币危机关系不大的行业进行干预，该组织似乎是在宣布其雄心之大。
It wanted to transform what had, until then, been widely considered well-run economies.
该组织想要对在危机前还广为认可的运行良好的经济体进行变革。
In particular, it seemed dead set on overturning what was known as the “Asian Model” of economic management, characterised by state-led investment in specific industries and firms.
尤其值得一提的是，该组织似乎决心要颠覆所谓的“亚洲经济管理模式”，这种模式的特点是国家对特定行业和企业的投资占主导。
This approach had yielded impressive results in several countries, not least Japan, which then boasted the world’s second-largest economy.
这种做法在几个国家取得了傲人的成绩，尤其是在当时号称世界第二大经济体的日本。
But it was widely seen by western officials and investors as anachronistic.
但西方官员和投资者普遍认为，这是一种过时的做法。
To them, the crisis had rung the death knell for this Asian statist alternative to the Anglo-American laissez-faire approach.
对他们来说，这场危机敲响了英美自由放任政策替代亚洲中央集权主义的丧钟。
This reformist zeal made the IMF unpopular across much of Asia.
这种改革热情使得该组织在亚洲大部分地区不受待见。
People were especially infuriated by demands to lift restrictions on foreign ownership of domestic firms.
人们尤其对取消外资对内资企业持股限制的要求感到愤怒。
As US and European corporations swooped in to buy up financial institutions in Thailand and South Korea at steep discounts, many denounced the IMF as neo-colonial.
当美国和欧洲企业乘虚而入，以极低价格大举收购泰国和韩国的金融机构时，许多国家谴责该机构是新殖民主义。
