很多人都曾报道过伊斯兰国家得到的资助和支持，尤其来自富有的海湾国家。实际上，我听到的指控中大多来自好战的伊拉克和叙利亚，而他们所指责的对象则是卡塔尔、土耳其以及沙特阿拉伯。然而事实却更为复杂，并需要进一步的探索。
It is true that some wealthy individuals from the Gulf have funded extremist groups in Syria. It is also true that Saudi Arabia and Qatar, believing that Syrian President would soon fall and that Sunni political Islam was a true vehicle for their political goals, funded groups that had strongly Islamist credentials.
无可否认的是，来自海湾国家的某些富人的确资助了叙利亚的极端组织;然而我们也必须看清，沙特阿拉伯和卡塔尔都认为叙利亚总统即将倒台，而逊尼派伊斯兰教将成为实现他们政治目标的工具，因此它们选择主张最鲜明的伊斯兰组织。
Turkey for its part operated a highly questionable policy of border enforcement in which weapons and money flooded into Syria, with Qatari and Saudi backing. All had thought that this would facilitate the end of Mr Assad's regime and the reordering of Syria into a Sunni power, breaking Shia Iran's link to the Mediterranean.
土耳其所实施的边境政策实际上存在很大问题，在卡塔尔和沙特阿拉伯的支持下，武器和金钱大批涌入叙利亚。人们普遍认为这将终结阿萨德的统治，使叙利亚重组归于逊尼派权力之下，并且中断什叶派与地中海的联系。
Yet as IS began its seemingly unstoppable rise in 2013, these groups were either swept away by it, or deciding it was better to join the winning team, simply defected bringing their weapons and money with them. So has Qatar funded Islamic State? Directly, the answer is no. Indirectly, a combination of shoddy policy and naivety has led to Qatar-funded weapons and money making their way into the hands of IS.
然而2013年以来，伊斯兰国家势力不断增长，这些极端组织或者被扫清，或者决定带着武器和金钱加入他们——毕竟他们是更有希望赢得胜利的一方。因此，我们可以说卡塔尔资助了伊斯兰国家吗?答案是：直接资助——并没有;间接资助——政策的漏洞和人为的忽视确实使武器和金钱流入了伊斯兰国家之手。
But there are deeper issues here; religious ties and sympathy for a group that both acts explicitly against Shia Iran's interests in the region and has the tacit support of more people in the Gulf than many would care to admit. The horrific acts committed by IS are difficult for anybody to support, but its goal of establishing a caliphate is certainly attractive in some corners of Islamic thought. Many of those who supported the goal have already found their way to Syria and have fought and died for Islamic State and other groups. Others express support more passively and will continue to do so for many years.
我们还必须考虑一些更深入的问题：宗教的束缚以及对组织的同情都有损于什叶派的利益，而且吸引了更多海湾国家人民秘而不宣的支持。伊斯兰国家骇人的举动让人无法赞同，但是它关于建立哈里发王权的想法还是获得了一些支持。许多支持这一想法的人为伊斯兰国家和其他组织而战，而牺牲;其他人则以相对不那么激进的方式持续多年地表示支持。
War Economy
战争经济
To understand how the Islamic State economy functions is to delve into a murky world of middlemen and shady business dealings. IS exports about 9,000 barrels of oil per day at prices ranging from about $25-$45. Some of this goes to Kurdish middlemen up towards Turkey, some goes for domestic IS consumption and some goes to the Assad regime, which in turn sells weapons back to the group.
若想理解伊斯兰国家的经济功能，我们需要深入探索到经纪商和暗箱商业活动中去。伊斯兰国家每年以每桶25~45美金的价格出口约9000桶原油，其购买者包括为土耳其服务的库尔德经纪商，另一些则为国内消费。剩下的则为阿萨德政权服务，而他们则通过向组织销售武器作为回报。
The point is that Islamic State is essentially self-financing; it cannot be isolated and cut off from the world because it is intimately tied into regional stability in a way that benefits not only itself, but also the people it fights.
重点在于，伊斯兰国家本质来讲属资金自筹范围。因而，它无法切断与外界联系保持独立。原因不只在于它和地区的稳定紧密相连，更在于它和为它战斗的人民的利益。
The larger question of course is whether such an integral pillar of the region can be defeated. Without Western military intervention it is unlikely. Although Sunni tribes in Iraq ponder their allegiances to the group, they do not have the firepower or finances necessary to topple IS and neither does the Iraqi army nor its Syrian counterpart.
更大的问题在于，它是否可能被击败，当然，如果没有西方武力干预这并不可能。尽管逊尼派表达了他们对组织的忠诚，但无论是他们，还是伊拉克军队或叙利亚武装，都没有足够的武力或经济实力以推翻伊斯兰国家。
